DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
IOWA STATE PENITENTIARY
FORT MADISON, IOWA

RELEASE AND RESPONSE
SECURITY AUDIT CONDUCTED BY NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS

On October 30 & 31, 2006 the National Institute of Corrections conducted a Security Audit of the Iowa State Penitentiary following the escape of Inmates Martin Moon and Robert Legendre on November 14, 2005.

Attached is a redacted copy of the report prepared by NIC Consultants Stan Czerniak with the Oregon Department of Corrections and James Upchurch with the Florida Department of Corrections.

It was necessary for the Iowa Department of Corrections to redact a number of statements that directly relate to either security concerns or personnel matters. The purpose for a redaction is stated at each location in the report. Confidential security issues are protected by Iowa Code 904.602-10. Confidential personnel issues are protected by Iowa Code 22.7(11).

Once the security issues and personnel matters have been resolved, the Department will disclose the full report.

Following each Issue and Recommendation as listed in the report, is the Penitentiary's response.

The Department and Penitentiary have only been in receipt of this report for a short period and as of this time have not been able to implement many of the recommendations. Also, many of the recommendations will require a cost that is not currently within the Penitentiary's current budget but will be requested in future appropriations.

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IOWA STATE PENITENTIARY

SECURITY STATUS REVIEW

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT #07C1009

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James R. Upchurch

OCTOBER 30-31, 2006

Fort Madison, Iowa

DISCLAIMER

RE: NIC Technical Assistance No. 07C1009

This technical assistance activity was funded by the Community Corrections/Prisons Division of the National Institute of Corrections. The Institute is a Federal agency established to provide assistance to strengthen state and local correctional agencies by creating more effective, humane, safe and just correctional services.

The resource persons who provided the on-site technical assistance did so through a cooperative agreement, at the request of the Iowa Department of Corrections, and through the coordination of the National Institute of Corrections. The direct on-site assistance and the subsequent report are intended to assist the agency in addressing issues outlined in the original request and in efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the agency.

The contents of this document reflect the views of Stan W. Czerniak and James R. Upchurch. The contents do not necessarily reflect the official views or policies of the National Institute of Corrections.

I. Introduction – Circumstances That Led to Request for Technical Assistance

On the evening of November 14, 2005 two maximum security offenders managed to successfully breach the very formidable perimeter of the Iowa State Penitentiary, which is located in Ft. Madison, Iowa.

As a result of this escape, the Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC) Office of the Inspector General undertook an immediate investigation into the factors that allowed this escape to occur. This investigation concluded that there were a number of errors made on the evening of November 14, 2005 that caused a breakdown of security and allowed the two offenders to escape without immediate detection.

Three categories of problems were identified by this investigation to have made this escape possible. These categories included: 1) accountability of offenders; 2) accountability of tools and materials; and 3) inadequate institutional procedures and lack of compliance or adherence to existing procedures.

In addition to the findings of this investigation, a long list of recommendations was made to improve the security at the Iowa State Penitentiary. Also, a number of immediate corrective actions were taken to include:

- Increasing the number of towers to be manned at various times of the day
- Adding a correctional officer to the Prison Industries Building when inmates are present
- Providing re-training to the workforce on security procedures and protocols
- Adopting more frequent shakedowns and searches of all places and people in the penitentiary
- Adding external lighting
- Requesting technical assistance from the National Institute of Corrections. The nature of this assistance will be covered shortly.

In addition, several leadership changes to the Iowa State Penitentiary were made to include the appointment of a new Warden, John Ault who formerly served as the Warden of the maximum security Anamosa State Penitentiary.

Shortly after the completion of this investigation the IDOC also conducted an in-depth security audit of the Iowa State Penitentiary. The final report for this security audit was completed on January 16, 2006 and includes several additional recommendations to enhance security at this prison.

As was noted earlier, the Iowa Department of Corrections formally requested that the National Institute of Corrections provide them with technical assistance. The highlights regarding the scope of this assistance included:

1. Review of the November 14, 2005 escape from the Iowa State Penitentiary
2. Review of the security-related policies and standard operating procedures pertaining to perimeter security, inmate movement and inmate accountability
3. Review of the Iowa State Penitentiary in regard to:
    a. Design of the penitentiary with particular attention to the configuration of the perimeter including detection capability and deterrence
    b. Prison population/custody grades
    c. Staffing levels and distribution
    d. Post orders
4. Review of any other materials provided by the IDOC
5. Assign a consultant to perform an on-site tour and security review of the Iowa State Penitentiary to observe and evaluate:
    a. Actual security practices, particularly in regards to perimeter security as well as security practices in the prison industry shop of the penitentiary
    b. Physical plant
    c. Overall security systems and operations.

II. Initial and Subsequent Contacts with the Consultants

During the month of June 2006 Mr. Larry Brimeyer, Deputy Director of the Iowa Department of Corrections contacted Mr. Stan W. Czerniak and asked if he was interested in participating in a NIC Technical Assistance project at the Iowa State Penitentiary. Mr. Czerniak is currently the Assistant Director for Operations of the Oregon Department of Corrections. In this role he is responsible for the day-to-day operation of all of Oregon's prisons. In addition, Mr. Czerniak has performed numerous security reviews and provided security standards training nationally for NIC and individual states.

In the course of this conversation Mr. Brimeyer described the purpose of this technical assistance as providing a security review of the factors that ultimately resulted in a breakdown of security to the extent that two inmates were able to escape. He also indicated that he would like Mr. Czerniak to review and comment on recommended security enhancements, both procedurally and to the physical plant, that were designed to improve on prison security.

Mr. Czerniak expressed an interest in participating in this technical assistance and also recommended that a second consultant be assigned to this project. In the consultant's experience, security reviews are usually much more comprehensive and beneficial when conducted with more than "one set of eyes."

Often times two consultants working together will uncover more deficiencies and come up with better suggested solutions than in the case of one consultant working alone. In other words, it is not unusual for one consultant to observe deficiencies that the other may miss. In addition, two or more consultants bringing to bear their collective experience often results in recommendations that are more comprehensive, workable, reliable and of better overall quality.

When asked to recommend a person as the second consultant, Mr. Czerniak suggested Mr. James Upchurch, who is the Bureau Chief for Security Operations for the Florida Department of Corrections. Mr. Upchurch has a vast amount of prison/security experience as a Warden of several prisons, including a super-max and has been in charge of Florida's prison security

operations for over ten years. He has also performed numerous prison security audits and reviews in several states for NIC.

Mr. Upchurch was contacted and agreed to participate as the second consultant for this technical assistance.

In addition, through communications between all parties, it was decided that to complete the scope of the project, that the consultants would have to be on-site at the Iowa State Penitentiary for at least two full days. Due to scheduling difficulties among all of the participants this could not occur until October 30 and 31, 2006.

III. Description of the Problem After Arrival of the Consultants at the Iowa State Penitentiary

At 8:00 a.m. on October 30, 2006 the consultants met in the Warden's conference room with Warden John F. Ault and members of his management team. These members will be identified in a later portion of this report. During this meeting, the warden and members of his staff described the sequence of events that ultimately led to the escape of two maximum security inmates on November 14, 2005. A summary of the events that resulted in this escape include the following:

On November 14, 2005, offenders Robert Legendre and Martin Moon were in a work assignment of the Iowa State Penitentiary at the time of their disappearance. They were part of a work crew consisting of 20 offenders that were being supervised on the fourth floor of the Industries Shop by a Prison Industries supervisor. This crew of offenders was working a special second shift from 2:30 p.m. to 6:25 p.m. due to production deadlines for a work order. There was no other production work being performed during this timeframe on floors 1, 2 or 3 of the Prison Industries Building. Since this was a special second shift work project, there were no correctional officers being utilized and supervision was left to the responsibility of the Prison Industry Supervisor.

At about 5:18 p.m. cameras in the Industry Building at several different locations showed the following sequence of events:

- Fourth floor stairwell door opening
- Three offenders coming down the stairwell and at the third floor landing
- Offenders on the second floor landing
- Three offenders observed by the Industry Building cameras entering the first floor
- One offender back on the first floor and goes back up the stairwell to the fourth floor at 5:30 p.m.

According to the offender that changed his mind about escaping, Offender Martin Moon, Offender Robert Legendre and himself had planned this escape for some time. They had done several things in preparation for the escape.

- The offenders had tested the strength of the burlap material by securing it in the Prison Industries Building and walking on it to ensure it would hold their body weight.
- Each of the offenders had gradually smuggled food, bottled water and first aid items into the Prison Industry Building to take with them after escaping. They had made two pouches out of sweat pant material to hold these items and there was a rope connecting the two pouches that could be slung around their neck. This was confirmed by a search of the first floor industry building where the offender who changed his mind about escaping indicated he left behind his pouches.
- Each offender agreed to make a small guiding hook, which was to be used in helping them get across the burlap material to the top of the wall – this device would have been necessary due to the offender's body weight and the weight of the food pouches. The plan was to loop their pant belt through the guiding hook and fasten around their chest. This would have then allowed the offenders to place the burlap material through the guiding hook and pull themselves along the burlap material that was used to get up and over the taut wire system on the west wall.

- The grappling hook was fabricated out of metal piping and air nozzle tips that are commonly used in the Prison Industries Building. According to the offender that changed his mind about escaping, the grappling hook was assembled on the evening of November 14, 2005 by Offender Martin Moon at his workstation and carried down the stairwell.
- The burlap material is also common material in the Prison Industry building and was secured to the grappling hook with a knot and some black electrical tape.
- Cameras in the stairwell recorded offenders Robert Legendre, Martin Moon and the offender that changed his mind and did not complete the escape, walking out of the fourth floor of the Prison Industries Building and going down the stairwell to the first floor at 5:18 p.m. The Prison Industries Building windows are not within range of the security cameras but testimony of the offender who changed his mind indicates the offenders exited through a window on the first floor of the Industries Building.
- All three offenders walked approximately 50 feet to an eight-foot chain link fence that contains strands of razor wire on top. The offenders threw their prison-issued denim jackets on top of the razor wire to assist with avoiding injuries when climbing over this fence and razor wire.
- Once on top of this chain-link fence and razor wire, Offenders Martin Moon and Robert Legendre threw the grappling hook and their supplies to the top of the maintenance building roof. The offenders then jumped some twenty feet to the maintenance building roof. It is believed this is where Offender Robert Legendre injured his foot. Testimony of the offender who changed his mind about escaping was that he heard a loud popping sound right after Offender Robert Legendre jumped.
- The offender who changed his mind about escaping went back through the first floor Prison Industry building window and back up the stairwell to the fourth floor.
- Offenders Martin Moon and Robert Legendre walked across the roof of the maintenance building and tied the burlap to a wooden clump, which was then secured to an electrical conduit piping. The burlap material was then used to lower them to the ground.

- Offenders Martin Moon and Robert Legendre then proceeded to building 297, which is the old lifers' unit located by the west wall. There is an old steel cell that surrounds a door to building 297 which the offenders climbed to gain access to the roof of building 297.
- The grappling hook and burlap was then thrown to the top of the metal railing on the catwalk area that connects Towers #4 and #5. Once the hook was attached to the metal railing and any slack in the burlap removed, the burlap was tied to a wood clamp and secured to a vent pipe coming out the top of building 297.
- Offenders Martin Moon and Robert Legendre then utilized the guide hook attached to their belt, and secured around their chest, to pull themselves along the burlap from the top of building 297 to the top of the west wall catwalk area. The grappling hook was left in place. Once successfully returning to the fourth floor of the Prison Industries Building after changing his mind about escaping, the offender testified watching Offenders Martin Moon and Robert Legendre pulling themselves along the burlap from building 297 catwalk area.
- Offenders Martin Moon and Robert Legendre then proceeded down the catwalk to tower #4 and tied a 35-foot piece of burlap to the metal walkway railing and lowered themselves to the ground outside of the Iowa State Penitentiary.
- Offenders Martin Moon and Robert Legendre then proceeded to the first residential house and took a bicycle that was in the yard.
- Offender Martin Moon took the bicycle in search of a vehicle since Offender Robert Legendre was injured.
- Offender Martin Moon discovered an unoccupied, running vehicle several blocks away and stole the vehicle.
- Testimony of the vehicle owner indicated the car was left running while in a friend's house.

[redacted] *(Redacted due to Personnel Issue)*

At the conclusion of the briefing the consultants were asked to review the events surrounding this escape and the subsequent recommended corrective actions as well as the corrective actions that have already been implemented.

The consultants were also asked to review the IDOC's practice of using dogs as part of the cell-extraction process. Prior to this request, Human Rights Watch had sent the IDOC a letter expressing their concerns with using dogs as a part of cell extractions.

IV. An Overview of Technical Assistance Activities:

Prior to arriving in Iowa, the consultants communicated with Mr. Larry Brimeyer and requested any investigative reports or security audits that were pertinent to this investigation.

Communications consisted of telephone calls, e-mails, and a face-to-face visit between Mr. Czerniak and Mr. Brimeyer during the NIC Deputy Director's Forum in Park City, Utah.

Mr. Brimeyer forwarded investigative reports, a security audit and an article from Human Rights Watch. These materials were reviewed prior to the on-site portion of this technical assistance.

The consultants arrived in Ft. Madison, Iowa on the evening October 29, 2006 and spent October 30-31 on-site at the Iowa State Penitentiary.

The initial briefing between Warden Ault his staff and the consultants was attended by:

- John F. Ault, Warden
- Randy Stroud, Assistant Associate Warden – Security
- Brad Hier, Associate Warden – Administration
- Ron Welder, Executive Officer
- Becky Munoz, Associate Warden – Industries
- Kris Weitzell, Assistant Deputy Director – Western Region
- Sheryl Lockwood, Assistant Deputy Director – Eastern Region
- Phyllis Porter, Executive Officer – Human Resources
- William Sperfslage, Deputy Warden
- Deborah Nichols, Associate Warden – Security
- Stan W. Czerniak, NIC Consultant
- James R. Upchurch, NIC Consultant

It should be noted that the AFSCME president was invited to participate in this briefing, but elected not to be involved. The consultants were disappointed by this decision as it was felt that his concerns, issues and recommendations could have possibly contributed additional valuable information and insight to this final report.

At the conclusion of this briefing, the consultants, warden and officials of the IDOC toured the Iowa State Penitentiary. Particular attention was paid to walking thorough the areas where the actual sequence of events occurred that the ultimately led to the November 14, 2005 escape.

The areas of the main penitentiary that were toured during the day on Monday, October 30, 2006 include:

- Industries Building
- Cell blocks (inmate living areas)
- Segregation
- Mental Health Complex
- Food Services
- Recreation Building
- Security Administration

During the evening hours after darkness on October 30, 2006, the consultants returned to the main penitentiary and walked most of the perimeter wall. During this walk, Warden Ault, Deputy Warden Sperflage and Associate Warden for Security Deborah Nichols accompanied the consultants. Also during this walk, lighting, sight lines and perimeter security integrity were observed and examined.

In addition, several towers were visited and officers assigned interviewed.

On Tuesday, October 31st, the consultants toured the John Bennett Unit as follows:

- Housing Areas
- Maintenance Building
- The Industries Building
- Hobby Craft
- Food Services

The Unit's perimeter was also walked and observed. In addition, on this day, the consultants returned to the main penitentiary and toured the main vehicle gate and gate house, hobby craft area, property storage and the clothing room. Additionally the Industries Building was re-visited and the end-of-the-day inmate check-out and shakedown process was closely observed.

V. Analysis and Specific Recommendations

The consultants were continually impressed by the professionalism, dedication and willingness to assist of all the ISP staff encountered during this project. Without exception, every staff member who the consultants met was extremely polite, helpful, friendly and cooperative.

Also impressive was the caliber of leadership and knowledge of institutional operations that was exhibited by Warden Ault and his management staff. These individuals were obviously dedicated to their profession, the IDOC and to the mission of protecting the public.

All areas visited at ISP were well-maintained and very clean and orderly. It was obvious that the staff at the Iowa State Penitentiary take pride in their workplace, and in the job that they do.

The consultants deeply appreciated the assistance and hospitality afforded to them by Warden Ault and all of his staff.

The following are a list of issues and specific recommendations that the consultants agree would enhance the security of the Iowa State Penitentiary.

Issue #1: The taut wire system that is utilized to detect any attempt to breach the secure perimeter at the main unit is installed so low on the wall that its effectiveness can be compromised too easily. In the case of the November 14, 2005 escape, inmates were able to go over the top of the taut wire without actually having to negotiate it. Although, the removal of the Death House and plans to remove the Hobby Craft Building will make it more difficult to bypass the taut wire system, it is conceivable that inmates could still devise a method to again bypass this system. [redacted] ***(Redacted due to Security Issue)***

Recommendation #1: While the consultants agree that adding additional rolls of razor wire on the wall above the taut wire make it more difficult to breach the perimeter, a more "fail-safe" approach would be to raise the taut wire system to the top of the perimeter wall. This approach would ensure that the taut wire system would have to be negotiated in order to get over the wall. [redacted] ***(Redacted due to Security Issue)***

DOC RESPONSE #1:

Initial conversations indicate the cost to raise the taut wire system to the top of the wall could exceed $500,000.

Adding 3 additional razor coils above the taut wire system is projected to cost approximately $55,000. Additional coils could be added for a "per foot price", although this does not provide an optimal security approach.

Issue #2: The taut wire system is only checked for proper operation by manually testing the system once each quarter. The consultants agree that this is much too long of an interval to be testing the integrity of proper operation of this crucial system.

Recommendation #2: Contact the manufacturer of the taut wire system for their recommendation regarding the proper method and frequency to manually test the system to ensure proper operation.

DOC RESPONSE #2:

At this time a Daily Fence Inspection Report is done by a Correctional Officer assigned to perimeter inspections. Quarterly (last check 12/11/06) and semi-annual tests are completed by the Communications Department. Specifications regarding "hands-on" testing of the taut wire system are being confirmed through the manufacturer.

Issue #3: In the IDOC's investigation of the November 2005 escape it is recommended that "High Mast lighting should be installed, or a significant upgrade made to the current lighting fixtures to include perimeter walls, interior buildings and yards." [redacted] ***(Redacted due to Personnel Issue)***

Recommendation #3: The consultants concur that the IDOC should strongly consider the installation of high mast lighting in those areas most poorly lit and that other enhanced lighting be considered where the use of high mast lighting may be impractical due to obstruction and shadowing resulting from the location of buildings or other objects in more congested areas.

DOC RESPONSE #3:

High mast lighting funds have been requested through Major Maintenance for the past several fiscal years as part of the electrical upgrade. At this point the electrical upgrade is in its 5th phase and high mast lighting has not been approved. Estimates indicated the cost could be as high as $1.2 million and would depend on the design.

Issue #4: The current perimeter and interior camera system does not provide for digital recording capability. [redacted]

(Redacted due to Security Issue)

Recommendation #4: The IDOC should pursue steadily increasing the number of cameras that have digital recording capability.

DOC RESPONSE #4:

Negotiations have been ongoing over the past year with Siemens regarding a price for a new digital system for ISP. Originally the price was estimated at $450,000. The most recent price quote was $400,000. DOC is also considering the option of leasing a digital recording system.

Issue #5: The practice at the main vehicle sally port is to manually search all exiting vehicles. Numerous escapes throughout the country have occurred when inmates were able to use ingenious methods to hide in exiting vehicles, including delivery trucks and garbage trucks. Currently, there are no provisions to use heartbeat technology to assist in the search of vehicles exiting the penitentiary. This technology has proven to be extremely reliable in detecting inmates who were very well hidden in vehicles departing prisons throughout the country. This

issue is particularly important for institutions such as ISP where prison industry programs require that large trucks deliver raw materials and exit with loads of finished product.

Recommendation #5: The IDOC is encouraged to purchase and utilize heartbeat technology at the Iowa State Penitentiary as back-up to the manual search process for all vehicles departing the perimeter. As we recall, the facility is in possession of such a system but it is not in use. These systems have proven effective in numerous departments across the country. We recommend that the utilization of the existing system be reinstituted and that the repair and or adjustments be accomplished to insure effectiveness. New systems are available for lease, rent or direct purchase if necessary. The heart beat detection system can be an integral part of a process including escort and constant observation by security staff of large trucks while they are inside the perimeter and being loaded or unloaded; a head count of all inmates with access to the loading dock(s) prior to allowing the truck to exit and insuring that a steering wheel lock or other such device is utilized whenever the driver is out of the vehicle while it is inside the facility.

DOC RESPONSE #5:

The heartbeat monitor currently owned by ISP is in need of replacement and is not operational. The cost of a new monitor is $35,690.68. The budget is being reviewed to find any available funds to purchase this piece of equipment.

Issue #6: There is no special security-related training provided to Prison Industries staff who are assigned to supervise inmate production activities. These individuals need this type of training to make them more aware of good security practices geared towards prevention of escape, manufacture of weapons and smuggling of dangerous contraband. This is particularly true if industries staff is to continue to be utilized to perform functions normally performed by security officers.

Recommendation #6: All Prison Industry staff who are assigned to supervise inmates should receive appropriate security related training. Upon completion of this training, industry staff security responsibilities should be specified in job descriptions and included in performance

evaluation documents. Industries staff should clearly understand these responsibilities and that they can and will be held accountable for any failure to perform them as required.

DOC RESPONSE #6:

All IPI staff will receive appropriate security related training. New IPI hires will attend the DOC Pre-service Training.

Issue #7: The current metal detectors are not as effective as current "state of the art" models. [redacted] ***(Redacted due to Security Issue)***

Recommendation #7: Purchase a state of the art metal detector to be used for shakedowns of inmates exiting the Prison Industries Building. The upgraded detector should be installed properly to insure that it is stable to avoid vibration issues interfering with effective operation.

DOC RESPONSE #7:

Issue will be resolved in the near future.

Issue #8: The metal detector currently used to search inmates for metal who are leaving the Prison Industries Building is not hard-wired, but rather is plugged in. [redacted] ***(Redacted due to Security Issue)***

Recommendation #8: This metal detector should be hard-wired to afford better reliability and security.

DOC RESPONSE #8:

A work order has been submitted to hard-wire the metal detector.

Issue #9: To ensure better security for the processing of inmates into and out of the Prison Industries Building, it is best to use a "strip-room" process. In this process, inmates who enter the strip-room must first strip naked and hang all their clothing in an assigned locker. These inmates then must pass through a "state of the art" metal detector and enter another room where they will be issued a work uniform. This area is designed so that no "pass around" or "pass back" tactics by inmates are possible. These inmates are then allowed to enter the Industries Building. This process is then repeated in reverse for inmates who are leaving the Industries Building i.e., they enter the strip-room and remove their work uniform. They then pass through the metal detector and enter the room where their regular inmate uniform is stored. In this room they put on their regular inmate uniform and then exit the strip-room and return to their assigned housing unit. Additionally, the current exit process area is congested and does not "flow" appropriately to exclude the possibility of errors in counting, identification and tool/contraband control.

Recommendation #9: Explore constructing a "strip-room" and utilize for all inmates entering and leaving the Industries Building. The functionality of this area is critical to insuring that an industry of the type at ISP can be safely and securely operated within a maximum security facility.

DOC RESPONSE #9:

It was determined that the construction of a "strip-room" at this time was not feasible. The possibility of the current Industries building being demolished or remodeled would cause any new building / remodeling project to become obsolete and therefore not cost effective.

Issue #10: 24 inmate workers are assigned to the second floor of the Industries Building. These 24 inmates are issued 16 fully stocked tool cabinets. These cabinets contain numerous tools, including tools that are classified as Class A (inherently hazardous). This would seem

like an excessive amount of tools for the small number of inmates who work on this floor. Also, this large number of tools is difficult to keep track of and to ensure proper accountability.

Recommendation #10: The consultants feel that an in-depth analysis of the tool usage in this area would show that production would not suffer, with a reasonable reduction in the number of tools and tool cabinets. Perhaps the number of tool cabinets could be reduced to 12 or less by having more inmates share tools. The fewer tools that are used in an area, the greater the accountability and the less chance of tools being missed or misused.

DOC RESPONSE #10:

At this time there has been an approximate 20% reduction of tools on the tool carts. Specialty tools that are seldom used are being removed from the carts and being moved to the 2nd floor "specialty tool room", to be checked out upon needing them.

Biscuit cutters have been removed from the carts. More tools will be removed once the internal security audit is completed so that the inventories are accurate and in line with what is on the carts. The downsizing of the tool carts will continue.

Issue #11: The consultants observed the presence throughout the industries building of a very large quantity of various materials utilized in the manufacturing process. [redacted]

(Redacted due to Security Issue.) The amount of such materials and the relatively disorganized manner in which they were located throughout the industries building causes significant concern. Adequate searches at appropriate intervals to prevent inmates from misusing such materials to make weapons, escape paraphernalia, etc. and subsequently being able to hide them in the industries area would, in our opinion, be very difficult, if not impossible to accomplish under the current circumstances.

Recommendation #11: All industry materials [redacted] ***(Redacted due to Security Issue)*** should be secured and accounted for when they are not in immediate use during production. Materials should be organized and arranged in a secure manner that facilitates searches and daily accountability by assigned security/production staff. Implementation of this recommendation will undoubtedly create some

inconvenience for production staff, but the critical security importance of this requirement must take precedence.

DOC RESPONSE #11:

ISP staff and IPI Techs have been working to secure this area.

Wood will be palletized. The materials that are not needed currently are being kept off the floor.

Issue #12: There are very sturdy yellow railings near the wall and near the area where the former death house stood. [redacted] ***(Redacted due to Security Issue)***

Recommendation #12: These railings should be further addressed and [redacted] ***(Redacted due to Security Issue)*** if possible, they should be removed.

DOC RESPONSE #12:

The rails will be removed.

Issue #13: [redacted] ***(Redacted due to Personnel Issue)***

Recommendation #13: [redacted] ***(Redacted due to Personnel Issue)***

Issue #14: The consultants observed some large group inmate movements during our facility tours. Of particular concern was a movement from the gymnasium area to the housing unit occurring during the hours of darkness on the evening of October 30. There were officers observed to be escorting the movement by positioning themselves at the front and the end of the inmates involved. The problem arose from the failure of the officers to keep the inmates together and under observation. The inmates at the head of the line were entering the dormitory while inmates were still exiting the gymnasium. The movement occurred in such a manner that an inmate(s) could have slipped away undetected.

Recommendation #14: Particularly during hours of darkness all movement of maximum security inmates should be tightly controlled and all inmates involved maintained under constant direct observation in tightly managed groupings. This is especially true until such time as the lighting concerns addressed elsewhere in the report can be addressed.

DOC RESPONSE #14:

CCU offenders are being escorted back from the gym during the hours of darkness with an officer in the front and one at the end.

Issue #15: Interior security fencing and gates [redacted] ***(Redacted due to Security Issue)*** have breaks in the razor wire [redacted] ***(Redacted due to Security Issue)***

Recommendation #15: The consultants recommend that all interior fences and gates be evaluated as to their actual effectiveness in controlling inmate access to restricted areas. [redacted]

[redacted] ***(Redacted due to Security Issue)***

DOC RESPONSE #15:

Fencing upgrades are going to be completed by the maintenance department through additional razor coil and swing stop installations. There may also be fences that are not necessary when Hobbycraft moves to its new location.

It should be noted that the consultants did explore the use of dogs during all extractions issue but were advised that IDOC no longer maintains this practice.